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test. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 36 (1866) (Every species of tort,

jurisdiction in noncommercial situations, was the "potential disruptive

high seas or navigable waters is of admiralty cognizance). The Court

impact" of such incidents on maritime commerce. Id. at 674-675. In

in Execu tive Jet, however, noted "serious difficulties" when the

the case at bar, the Court decided that this element, when qualified by

"locality" test was mechanically applied to "perverse and casuistic

the requirement that the incident also "arise" out of an activity that

borderline situations." /d. at 268.

bears a substantial relation to traditional maritime activities, naturally
served to clarify the intended jurisdiction.

This second requirement became most important in noncommercial

The Court purposefully relaxed the qualifying requirement and

"borderline" situations, and in such cases the federal courts struggled

�

emphasized that the definition of "traditional maritime activities"

to defme "tra itional maritime activities." Following Chapman v. City

requires "broad perspective," in order to maintain the desired breadth

of Grosse Potnt Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967), a case upon

and uniformity. Thus, under the new test, the Court found, the fire on

which the decision in Executive Jet was largely based, the lower

board Sisson's yacht clearly falls within admiralty jurisdiction, as it

courts required a relationship between the wrong and maritime com

was a potential hazard to maritime commerce that could spread to

merce or navigation. Unfortunately, the strict application of this defi

nearby commercial vessels or make the marina inaccessible to such

nition narrowed the scope of admiralty jurisdiction to a point unin

vessels, and because it "arose" from an activity that bore a substantial
relation to traditional maritime activity - the storage and mainte

tended by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the application of this
defmition produced irreconcilably different results than if the case had

nance of a vessel. Moreover, applying the same test to an identical

involved a commercial vessel. For example, in the case at bar, there

commercial situation would produce the same result.

can be little doubt that, notwithstanding the Admiralty Extension Act,

To ensure that jurisdiction, under this new test, would not be nar
rowed by application, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the

46 U.S.C. §740 (1970), a fire on board a commercial vessel which
destroys the vessel and damages the adjacent pier would fall within

incident over which admiralty jurisdiction is sought, must be charac

admiralty jurisdiction. However, the same fire on board a pleasure

terized by its "general features." In this case for example, the jurisdic

vessel did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction because it did not bear

�

tional inquiry did not turn on the source of the fire or the specific loca

significant relation to the traditional maritime activities of naviga

tion of the yacht, but rather, on whether a fire could potentially disrupt

tiOn or commerce.

maritime commerce. Moreover, the activity from which the incident

Thus the Supreme Court was faced with the necessity of clarifying

arose was not a laundry room fire on board a vessel, but simply the

the test so that it would maintain the desired breadth of jurisdiction

storage and maintenance of a vessel on navigable waters. It is through

and also, uniformly between commercial and noncommercial inci

this type of "general" characterization, the court held, that the funda

dents. As a result, the Court held that admiralty jurisdiction is now
proper, under 28 U.S.C.

mental interest of admiralty jurisdiction will be satisfied.

§ 1331(1), when the incident at issue: 1)

The Supreme Court did recognize that Sisson had also argued that

occurs on navigable waters and 2) is a potential hazard to maritime

the Limitation of Liability Act provided an independent basis for mar

commerce arising out of an activity that bears a substantial relation to

itime jurisdiction. In dictum in the opinion, the Court pointed out that

traditional maritime activity.

since thee was jurisdiction under

In reformulating the test, the Court relied heavily on the underlying

§ 1331(1), there was no need to

decide that issue. However, the Court implied that if the issue again

rationale of its previous decision in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson,

presented itself, it would hold that the Limitation of Liability Act

457 U.S. §668 (1982) (involving the collision of two pleasure craft).

would not independently provide jurisdiction.

In Foremost, the Court recognized that the foundation for admiralty
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UNITED STATES ex rei. VALDERS STONE & MARBLE V. C· WAY CONSTR. CO.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 3 August 1990
909 F.2d 259

Cargo owner is not liable for breach of implied warranty of workmanlike performance nor under third party beneficiary theory to barge
owner for negligence of stevedore with whom cargo owner had contracted.
FACTS: A contractor on a federal marine construction project in

2) Is the cargo owner, Valders, who contracts with a stevedore,

Indiana, C-Way Construction Company (C-Way), hired a barge from

Strauss, to load stone onto a barge liable to the barge owner, Selvick,

bareboat charterer Selvick Marine Towing Company (Selvick), to

for damages resulting from alleged negligence on the part of the

transport stone. The stone supplier, Valders S to n e & Marble

stevedore?

(Valders), contracted with Rusty Strauss & Son Excavating (Strauss),

ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to

to load the stone on the barge. The barge was damaged in the loading

apply pendent appellate jurisdiction to Valders' cross-appeal against

process, allegedly as a result of negligence on the part of Strauss.

C-Way, and dismissed it without prejudice. The court found there was

When C-Way refused to pay, claiming a setoff due to its obligation to

no admiralty jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit had previously stat

compensate Selvick for damage to the barge, Valders brought suit

ed that pendent appellate jurisdiction will be found only in a limited

against C-Way for payment on the stone. In a trial between Valders

number of cases, such as "[w]hen an ordinarily unappealable inter

and C-Way, before a federal magistrate, Valders' motion for summary

locutory order is inextricably entwined with a appealable [interlocuto

judgment was denied and the dispute was resolved in favor of C-Way.

ry] order" and only if "there are compelling reasons for not deferring

Selvick intervened in the suit claiming that Valders was liable for the

the appeal of the former order to the end of the lawsuit." Ill. ex rei.

barge damage on the theories of non-delegable duty in contract and

Hartigan V. Peters, 861 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1988). A close rela

the warranty of workmanlike performance in admiralty. Summary

tionship was not adequate, "it must be practically indispensable."

judgment was granted to Valders on Selvick's claim for the reasons

As to Selvick's appeal, the court applied general maritime law in

that Strauss was an independent contractor and that Selvick lacked

addressing both the breach of implied warranty of workmanlike con

privity with Valders. Selvick appealed and Valders cross-appealed.

duct and third party beneficiary arguments. Selvick argued that the

ISSUES: 1) Should the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction be

doctrine developed in Ryan Stevedoring Co.

applied to a non-admiralty based interlocutory order (Valders v. C

v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp. , 350 U.S. 124 (1956), should be applied. The Ryan doctrine

Way) if its resolution is not essential to resolving the primary appeal?

was developed to allow a shipowner to bring an indemnity action

3

-

-

against a stevedore whose breach of the warranty of workmanlike per

The court also rejected Selvick's claim that it was an intended ben

formance, implicit in the stevedoring contract, resulted in injuries for
which the shipowner was held liable. Its purpose was to make the

eficiary of the stone supply contract between Valders and C-Way.
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sees. 302, 304

party responsible for the injuries pay for the result of its negligence.

(1981), the court held that Selvick was only an incidental beneficiary

But while the court noted that the Ryan doctrine might no longer be

and, therefore, not entitled to damages from Valders. Finally, as

valid, (in light of the adoption by a number of circuits of the policy of

Selvick was unable to produce any evidence to substantiate its claim

apportioning liability according to the comparative fault of each party

as an intended beneficiary to the contract, the court held that Valders

as opposed to following indemnity principles espoused in Ryan), the

was accountable only to C-Way for any breach caused by the alleged

court did point out that it was unnecessary to decide its validity

negligence of Strauss.
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because Selvick's claim fell outside the scope of Ryan. The warranty
runs against the stevedore, not against the cargo owner who had mere
ly hired the stevedore, and in this case Selvick was suing the cargo
owner, Valders, and not the stevedore, Strauss.

HINES V. BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 23 July 1990
907 F.2d 726

Absent an express contractual provision to supervise stevedoring operations, a time charterer has no general duty to do so, and is not liable
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act for the injuries or death of a longshoreman arising out of such operations.
FACTS: On October 3, 1987, Clark Hines (Hines), a longshoreman

ISSUE: Did BSC, a time charterer, owe a duty to Ceres, an indepen

who was employed by Ceres Terminals, Inc. (Ceres), was killed while

dent stevedoring contractor, to supervise the stevedoring operations

performing stevedoring duties aboard the M.S. Ravenna (the

aboard the Ravenna?

Ravenna). British Steel Corporation (BSC) had time chartered the

ANALYSIS: In Scindia, the Supreme Court interpreted the vessel's

Ravenna from its owner, Roscoe Shipping, S.A., and had docked the

duty to inspect or supervise the stevedore's cargo operations under the

vessel in Chicago on October 1, 1987 to unload a cargo of steel. The

1972 amendments to 33 U.S.C. 905(b) as nonexistent. The court held

master and the crew of the Ravenna were employees of Roscoe

that a shipowner "is not liable to longshoremen for injuries caused by

Shipping.

dangers unknown to him." Although Scindia involved a shipowner

Just prior to the accident, the steel had been completely unloaded

and not a time charterer, the principles discussed there apply with

from the Ravenna. Hines and other Ceres employees were clearing

equal force to the present case.

dunnage (pieces of lumber used to protect cargo during transport) out

In this case, the crane was in good working condition, the danger

of the ship's holds. Captain Tore Sorenson, a Ceres superintendent,

ous act of the crane operator was unforeseeable, and the BSC cargo

was in charge of the stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. At

representative was not on board the vessel at the time of the accident.

the time of the accident, BSC's cargo representative, John Folan, was

Under these conditions, the court found, BSC is not liable pursuant to

not on board the vessel.

Scindia, absent an express contractual agreement. Appellant argued
that BSC contractually undertook control of the stevedoring opera

An unused bundle of dunnage was secured with Ceres owned
slings to one of the ship's cranes. The crane operator then improperly

tions and therefore had a duty of care to the Ceres employees under

swung the loaded crane over the open hatch of the hold in which the

Restatement of Torts (Second) 414. The court noted that the com

men were working. Swinging a loaded crane over an open hatch while

ments to Section 414 suggest that the right to make recommendations,

men are working below is a forbidden activity and Ceres crane opera

to inspect, and to order work stopped or resumed is not enough to

tors are instructed not to do so. For no discernible reason, the bundle

constitute retention of control, and that there must be a retention such

of dunnage fell from the crane and struck a dumpster in the hold. The

that the stevedore cannot do the work in his own manner. The court

bundle broke apart, and pieces of flying dunnage struck Hines, who

also noted that few courts have applied Section 414 in the context of a

later died.

lawsuit under Section 904(b) of the LHWCA, but the Supreme Court

Rachelle Hines, wife of the decedent, brought this action as special

in Scindia recognized the Restatement as a useful analytical tool.

administrator of his estate under the Longshore and Harbor Workers

However, the court also remarked that Section 414 does not address

(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §905 (b), against BSC to recover damages for

the contractual relationship between BSC and Roscoe Shipping.

her husband's death. She filed the suit in the Circuit Court of Cook

Accordingly, it is applicable only to the various agreements between

County, Illinois, but BSC removed it to the United States District

BSC and Ceres. Since BSC did not retain the requisite degree of con

Court for the Northern District Of Illinois. BSC then moved for sum

trol of stevedoring operations outlined in Section 414, no duty is

mary judgment on the grounds that it had no general duty to supervise

imposed on BSC by this section.

stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. The plaintiff asserted that

Appellant further argued that clause 8 of the charter agreement

the various agreements BSC made with Ceres and Roscoe Shipping

between BSC and Roscoe Shipping, together with paragraph "j" of

showed a clear intent by BSC to control Ceres unloading operations.

BSC's instructions to the ship's Master, gave BSC control over the

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BSC,

discharging of the cargo. Paragraph "j" gave BSC the right to appoint

fmding that BSC was amenable to suite under the LHWCA but con

a stevedore, who was to remain under the direct control of the ship's

cluding that the Supreme Court decision in Scindia Steam Navigation

Master. Clause 8 of the charter party provided in relevant part that the

Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) precluded a finding

captain would be under the orders of BSC and that BSC was to "load,

that BSC had a general duty to oversee Ceres operations. The court

stow, trim and discharge the cargo at its own expense but such

found that the language of the charter party, together with Captain

stowage shall be conducted by and under the control of the Master

Sorenson's testimony that Folan took no part in the actual stevedoring

and the Owners shall be responsible for the proper stowage and cor

operations, indicated that BSC had no special duty to ensure the safe

rect delivery of the cargo." The court observed that clause 8 is a stan-

ty of the longshoremen. Rachelle Hines appealed the decision.
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